The 10 Year Cycle: Peace Agreements and Conflict Resolution
Denika Blacklock Karim
It is quite tiresome to read commentaries
that discuss ‘conflict resolution’ in the context of the content of a peace
agreement. Although not an expert in the field of conflict resolution, I have
fairly good knowledge of what ‘resolving’ a conflict entails, and I’m sure I’m
not the only person who wants to bang her head against her desk (or table at
the local café, if I’m being honest) in frustration at this conflation of peace
agreements with resolving conflict. In fact, in my experience working in
post-conflict environments, the gaps in the content of peace agreements made
resolving the root causes of the conflict more difficult, not easier. This is
not to say that peace agreements are not an integral component of the conflict management process – they are
critical to bringing about an end to violence, but they rarely resolve conflict in and of themselves.
Why? Conflict results in divisions
in society which are wider than those that previously existed and are at the
root of the conflict to begin with. Thus, resolving
and transforming conflict necessitates not only bringing an end to
violence, and working to bridge these societal divides, but it also means
examining and addressing the initial
societal divides and root cause to the conflict.
This essay looks at three cases:
Bosnia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[i],
and Aceh, Indonesia. Each had highly publicized peace agreements that have been
deemed successful by commentators, politicians and practitioners alike.
However, the perpetuation of societal division and the root causes of the
conflict indicate that these ‘successful’ agreements lack a very significant
component.
Conflict Management versus Conflict Resolution
Contemporary theories of conflict
management tend to revolve around large-scale inter-ethnic conflicts because
most of the well-known conflicts that emerged in the immediate post-Cold War
era were indeed ethnic conflicts. Secondly, and as a direct result, conflict
management theories tend to view conflict through a majority-minority lens,
which has thus formed the basis of the ‘conflict management’ framework applied
across conflicts, countries, groups and cultures.
Based on experiences in the 1990s,
conflict management practice has built up around a general consensus that to
secure peace, it is necessary to demobilize combatants and restore social order.
According to Collier, et al, achieving this goal necessitated five steps: 1)
securing a negotiated settlement; 2) the relatively light presence of
peacekeeping troops; 3) encouraging a constitution based on democracy and some
degree of decentralized power; 4) support for governance and policy reform; and
5) elections to gain acceptance and legitimacy for the settlement in the wider
public[ii].
They argue that this process has been a ‘highly successful strategy, yielding resolutions to several wars’[iii].
(emphasis added). However, they also argue that post-conflict societies face
two distinct challenges: 1) economic recovery and 2) conflict risk reduction.
However, a weakness in conflict
management and resolution theory is that it is based on studies that over-emphasize
the early stages of conflict transformation (i.e. leading up to a peace
agreement) at the expense of assessing and responding to the rapidly changing
dynamics during the transition from a negative behavioural peace to a positive
structural peace[iv]. Because
peace agreements are very public and tend to receive significant media
attention, one could be lead to believe that peace agreements denote a
resolution of the root causes of a conflict, potentially (one could cynically
say ‘generally’) creating unreasonable expectations that peace will now reign.
In the words of Lederach,
‘Agreements that end a conflict are hard to find. Most peace accords are not
solutions in content but are proposed negotiated processes, which, if followed,
will change the expression of the conflict and provide avenues for redefining
relationships’[v]. Moreover,
Collier et al note that significant empirical evidence emerging from
quantitative studies on the causes of civil war indicate that the root causes
are one or more of the following: low per capita income, slow economic growth,
and large exports of natural resources[vi].
They concurrently note that post-conflict environments are generally
characterized as periods of power struggle between conflict protagonists (or
even within protagonist groups) in which economic and social policy is not
prioritized,[vii]
and post-conflict risks which are addressed primarily through a political lens[viii].
Given that peace agreements
themselves can lead to the increased politicization of society (see below), and
become the defining element of post-conflict politics, why don’t peace
agreements do more to ensure that the root causes of conflict are addressed?
Can peace agreements be considered successful if this critical element is
missing and languishes unresolved?
Peace Agreements in Focus
Anecdotal evidence from a number
of countries indicates that the peace agreements have come to be the defining
factor in the political landscape, sustaining conflict-era identities and
reinforcing divisions in society. With peace agreements setting the stage for
the post-conflict political landscape, their content is critically important. The
main components of the peace agreements of five high profile conflicts[ix]
in Southeast Europe and Asia include:
·
New (or amended) Constitution
·
Elections
·
Disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of combatants (DDR)
·
Reform of the police/security
sector
·
Return and reintegration of
refugees and IDPs
·
Assertion of a ‘multi-ethnic’
society
·
Reserved parliamentary seats of
ethnic groups/rebel factions
·
Proportional hiring for
government positions
·
Internal boundary revisions
·
Local government and
decentralization
·
Religious and cultural heritage
and symbols
The Dayton Peace Accords (21
November 1995) ended the violence in Bosnia after nearly four years of
inter-ethnic atrocities involving Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The conflict
emerged as a result of a complex web of historical, ethnic, territorial and
power-sharing issues following the declaration of independence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina from Yugoslavia in 1991. The peace agreement focused on defining
Bosnia as two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika
Srpska), with an accompanying constitution that described the intricate
power-sharing process, including a three member Presidency, the urgent need to
undertake DDR and reintegrate refugees and IDPs, and define the role of the
High Representative as the international monitoring instrument. The only
concession to economic and social rehabilitation and growth was the agreement
to establish a public corporation to rehabilitate transportation
infrastructure.
The Ohrid Framework Agreement (13
August 2001) sought to end the violent conflict between ethnic Macedonians and
Albanians which emerged as a result of long-held grievances of the minority
Albanian community relating to disenfranchisement and unequal economic
opportunities. It was specific in its assertion that ‘the development of local
self-government is essential […] for promoting respect for the identity of
communities.’ A large focus of the Agreement was on the accommodation of the
ethnic minority Albanian community, with decentralized governance including
enhanced local competencies, boundary revisions based on a census to be
undertaken, language and education rights, and the equitable representation in
central and local government bodies. There was no accommodation of economic and
social well-being within the Agreement, with the exception of a provision
within Annex C of the Agreement on the international financing of
rehabilitation and reconstruction projects.
The Helsinki Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005 following the December 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami which devastated the province of Aceh in Indonesia. The conflict in Aceh
had been on-going through many phases over 29 years, with GAM seeking the
independence of Aceh from Indonesia due to the central government’s exploitation
of Aceh’s significant oil and gas resources, leading to the economic stagnation
and cultural repression of the province. The MoU focused on the autonomy of
Aceh within the Republic of Indonesia, to be guaranteed in a “Law on the
Governing of Aceh”. Further, Aceh was granted the right to create Aceh-based
political parties (the only province in Indonesia with this right). The MoU
also included clauses on elections (and election monitors), rule of law and
human rights, DDR and amnesty, security, an international monitoring mission
and a dispute settlement mechanism. The only reference to the development of
the economy was that Aceh had the right to raise revenue through external
loans, and that the provincial government would now retain 70% of oil and gas
revenues, which is 5-10 times more than the revenue retained by other
provinces. While receiving fair monetary compensation for Aceh’s oil and gas
reserves was the main economic grievance of GAM, there was no stipulation in
the MoU on how this increase in revenue should directly relate to improved
economic development in the province.
The Reason Behind the ’10 year cycle’ in the Re-emergence of
Conflict?
In early 2014, violent protests
broke out in Bosnia, resulting from overwhelming public frustration with the
stagnant economy, high unemployment and poor government services. It could
easily have been construed as an ethnic issue (as so much of the public discord
in Bosnia has over the years), but it is important to look deeper. The peace
agreement put in place a framework for the country which ensured that any and
all public issues would be dealt with through an ethnic lens. This has meant
that every issue takes on nationalist/ethnic tones, and that there are no
‘technical issues’ in Bosnia[x].
As noted by Florian Bieber, the
power-sharing arrangements have empowered elites that promote ethnic identity
and have given little space for those political forces that offer different
programs focusing cooperation based on socio-economic issues[xi]. This
has led to complete political and economic stagnation, as politicians continue
to wrangle over the implementation of clauses in the peace agreement vis-à-vis
EU accession processes, undertake obstructionist policies in pursuit of
advantages for their own ethnic community. The peace agreement has sustained
the hostility between the political actors who negotiated and agreed to it,
meaning that the peace agreement has exclusive control over public life to the
detriment of any issues that were not expressly included in its contents, such
as mutually inclusive economic development and the improvement in social
welfare for the purposes of inter-ethnic reconciliation and addressing root
causes of the conflict. The current state of affairs has only exacerbated these
issues, as evidenced by the outburst of public frustration and protests against
a stagnant and divided government.
The Ohrid Framework Agreement in
Macedonia was by and large implemented without much interruption. This was
largely due to that fact that compliance with the agreement by Macedonia’s
ethnic communities would unofficially be rewarded with Euro-Atlantic
integration. However, when Macedonia failed to secure membership in NATO in
April 2008, it became apparent that Euro-Atlantic integration was the main
policy goal binding the two main ethnic communities together, and that the
parties had failed to address pressing domestic issues on inter-ethnic
reconciliation – issues that had remained dormant but were now again festering.
The first aggressive affront to the concept of a multi-ethnic society was Prime
Minister Gruevski’s national project, which focused almost exclusively on
ethnic Macedonian history and heroes, alienating other communities, and running
counter to the spirit of the Ohrid Agreement[xii].
Secondly, language laws were resulting in increased segregation rather than
integration and respect for other communities, as children were not being
taught each other’s languages. Public administration was being politicized as
the process of ‘achieving equitable representation’ was undertaken through
staffing government posts with party rank and file, not qualified candidates[xiii].
This lack of professionalism has meant that appropriate and concerted responses
to economic crises and downturns are absent, and non-partisan economic and
service delivery strategies and development programmes fail to bring meaningful
change to the lives of ordinary citizens. The Ohrid Agreement did bring an end
to violence, and result in a manageable power-sharing arrangement in the
country, but failed to address root issues of the conflict, including fair and
equitable economic and social development in the country.
Nine years on from the signing of
the Helsinki MoU, the situation in Aceh, Indonesia, is questionable. The
failure of the MoU to stipulate issues such as how post-conflict aid and reintegration assistance would be
delivered, and who would identify the beneficiaries of this aid, has resulted
in the capture of large amounts of post-conflict aid by factions of GAM[xiv].
Secondly, as the MoU was signed between the Government of Indonesia and GAM,
which has transformed itself into Partai Aceh, Partai Aceh/GAM has come to have
undue influence over politics and society in Aceh, not least because of an
assumption of a moral ‘right’ given its position as a party to the MoU. Partai
Aceh has increasingly controlled government and politics, through corruption[xv],
election intimidation and the threat of violence. They use the MoU as their
frame of reference, despite the fact that a Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) was
passed in 2007 and serves as the MoU’s implementing legislation. Partai Aceh
lacks any coherent political strategy other than to remain in power and ensure
the MoU is not violated. It has done very little to stimulate local economic
development, manage the transition from a post-disaster economy to a ‘regular’
economy; under its watch, the quality of health care and education have
slipped, and gains in environmental protection and anti-corruption under the
previous Governor, Irwandi Yusuf, have been ignored. As noted by International
Crisis Group, many Acehnese increasingly realize that the new rulers are not
much different than the old ones[xvi].
This sentiment does not bode well for continuing peace in Aceh given that the
needs of broader society are not perceived as being given high priority. In
light of the fact that Partai Aceh treats the MoU as the highest ‘law’ despite
the fact that it is not in itself a law, indeed the Law on Governing Aceh
(2007) was passed to implement the MoU, the inclusion of clauses which would
have mandated rights-based economic development and service delivery would have
committed the government to implementing these initiatives, and minimized the
development losses that have occurred under its watch, compared to the
anticipated development gains foreseen in the MoU (the LoGA has clauses to this
effect, but the emphasis on the MoU as the highest law has meant an absence of
priority on socio and economic development issues).
A New Approach to Assessing the ‘Success’ of Peace Agreements?
The cases above do much to point
out that peace agreements are critical for bringing an end to the violent stage
of conflict, but that sustained peace necessitates addressing and resolving the
root causes of that conflict. In most cases, peace agreements to not explicitly
do this, to date largely because peace agreements tend to be rushed processes
which take advantage of certain momentum in the conflict management cycle. As
such, the root causes of a conflict are left to lay dormant and begin to aggrevate
as the memories of violence slowly dim, and the ‘dividends’ of peace and luster
of post-conflict aid begin to wear off. Unless specifically mandated within a
peace agreement, there is nothing binding the parties to the conflict to indeed
resolve the conflict. There may be
illusions and references to the need to address economic policy and social
welfare, but without a specified time frame and identification of responsible
parties (as with the drafting of new constitutions and legislative agendas, or
implementation of post-conflict elections), those in power tend to be more
concerned about gaining as much as possible (individually and for their own
community) than with tackling complex and sensitive issues that rarely have
win-win outcomes. This problem was explicitly highlighted by Valerie Amos, UN
Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, when she noted ‘In many of
the conflict zones in which we work, there has been a manifest failure by
political leaders to be inclusive in their protection of their people, and to
realize that state sovereignty is a responsibility, rather than one of the
spoils of being in power’[xvii].
Therefore, it is not difficult to
see why conflict tends to reemerge within five to ten years of a peace
agreement. If this conclusion is applied to other conflicts, including
high-profile conflicts on-going in Central Africa Republic and South Sudan, it
lends insight into why, after so many years of civil war and international
interventions, conflict continues to emerge.
While peace agreements are far
from a panacea, unless they become more than tools to bring about a (temporary)
cessation of violence and actively and productively address – or at least
highlight and give priority to - the root causes of conflict in a society, they
are doomed to become one stage in a vicious cycle: violence, peace agreement,
elections, power struggle…. repeat.
[i] For the purposes of this essay, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be referred to ‘Macedonia’ for simplicity.
[ii] Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Mans
Soderbom (2006) Post-Conflict Risks. Oxford:
Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford
University, p. 3-4
[iii] Collier et al, p. 3
[iv] Dudouet, Veronique. (November 2006) Transitions from Violence to Peace: Revisiting
Analysis and Intervention in Conflict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof
Research Centre on Constructive Conflict Management. Report No. 15, p. 9
[v] Lederach, J.P. (2005) The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, p. 46
[vi] Collier et al, p. 4
[vii] Collier et al, p. 4
[viii] Collier et al, p. 5
[ix] Dayton Peace
Accords (Bosnia, 1995), Ohrid Framework Agreement (Macedonia, 2001), Ahtisaari
Status Proposal (Kosovo, 2007-2008), Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (Aceh,
Indonesia, 2005), Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Nepal, 2006)
[x] International Crisis Group. Bosnia’s Incomplete Transition: Between
Dayton and Europe. Europe Report No. 198, 9 March 2009, p. 2
[xi] Bieber, Florian (2014). Interview with
Theory in Practice on 9 June 2014. www.theory-in-practice.net/?p=425
[xii] International Crisis Group. Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict.
Europe Report No. 212, 11 August 2011, p. 2
[xiii] Ibid p. 10
[xiv] International Crisis Group. Aceh: So Far, So Good. Asia Briefing No.
44, 13 Dec 2005, p. 5
[xv] International Crisis Group. Aceh: So Far, So Good. Asia Briefing No.
44, 13 Dec 2005, p. 7; Aceh:
Post-Conflict Complications. Asia Report No. 139, 4 October 2007, p. 1, and
Indonesia: GAM vs GAM in the Aceh
Elections. Asia Briefing No. 123, 15 June 2011, p. 7
[xvi] International Crisis Group. Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications. Asia
Report No. 139, 4 October 2007, p. 15
[xvii] Amos, Valerie.
Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, Sorensen Lecture Series, New York,
13 January 2015
Comments
Post a Comment